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(a) Input images (b) Datapath visualization at the network- and layer-levels (c) Neuron visualization
Figure 1: Explanation why an adversarial panda image is not classified as a panda. The root cause is identified as the neurons
in the feature map FA failing to detect the outline of the panda’s ear (E) in the adversarial example, which further leads
to the failure of detecting the panda’s ear (B) in FC1.
Abstract—Adversarial examples, generated by adding small but intentionally imperceptible perturbations to normal examples, can
mislead deep neural networks (DNNs) to make incorrect predictions. Although much work has been done on both adversarial attack and
defense, a fine-grained understanding of adversarial examples is still lacking. To address this issue, we present a visual analysis method to
explain why adversarial examples are misclassified. The key is to compare and analyze the datapaths of both the adversarial and normal
examples. A datapath is a group of critical neurons along with their connections. We formulate the datapath extraction as a subset selection
problem and solve it by constructing and training a neural network. A multi-level visualization consisting of a network-level visualization
of data flows, a layer-level visualization of feature maps, and a neuron-level visualization of learned features, has been designed to help
investigate how datapaths of adversarial and normal examples diverge and merge in the prediction process. A quantitative evaluation
and a case study were conducted to demonstrate the promise of our method to explain the misclassification of adversarial examples.
Index Terms—Robustness, deep neural networks, adversarial examples, explainable machine learning.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated superior perfor-
mance in many artificial intelligence applications, such as pattern
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recognition and natural language processing [1], [2], [3]. However,
researchers have recently found that even a highly accurate DNN
can be vulnerable to carefully-crafted adversarial examples that
are intentionally designed to mislead a DNN into making incorrect
predictions [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. For example, an attacker can make
imperceptible modifications to a panda image (from I1 to I2 in
Fig. 1) to mislead a state-of-the-art DNN model [9] to classify it as
a monkey. This phenomenon creates high risk when applying DNNs
to safety- and security-critical applications, such as driverless
cars, face recognition ATMs, and Face ID security on mobile
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2phones [10]. For example, researchers have recently shown that
even the state-of-the-art public Face ID system can be fooled by
using a carefully-crafted sticker on a hat [11]. Thus, there is an
urgent need to understand the prediction process of adversarial
examples and identify the root cause of incorrect predictions [10],
[12]. Such an understanding is valuable for developing adversarially
robust solutions [13], [14], [15]. A recent survey identifies two
important questions that require analysis [10]: (1) why similar
images (e.g., adversarial and normal panda images) diverge into
different predictions, and (2) why images from different classes
(e.g., adversarial panda images and normal monkey images) merge
into the same prediction.
To give analytical answers to the questions, we need to solve
two technical challenges. The first is to disclose the prediction pro-
cess of a DNN. To this end, we need to extract the critical neurons
and their connections that are responsible for the predictions of
examples (Fig. 2 (b)). Such neurons and their connections form the
datapaths of examples [12]. However, in a DNN, the neurons have
complex interactions with each other [16]. Thus, it is technically
demanding to disentangle the roles of these neurons within the
entire network and extract the critical neurons to form the datapath.
The second challenge is to effectively illustrate and compare the pre-
diction processes of adversarial and normal examples based on the
extracted datapaths. A state-of-the-art DNN usually contains hun-
dreds of layers, with millions of neurons in each layer [9]. Thus, an
extracted datapath potentially contains millions of neurons and even
more connections. Directly visualizing all the neurons and connec-
tions in the extracted datapath will result in excessive visual clutter.
To tackle these challenges, we have developed a visual analysis
tool, AEVis, to help identify the root cause of misclassification
of adversarial examples. Fig. 1 shows an example of using AEVis
to analyze why an adversarial panda image is misclassified. On the
one hand, we find that the extracted datapaths of the adversarial
and normal panda images start to diverge at layer LA (Fig. 1) and
eventually lead to different predictions. On the other hand, merging
starts at layer LC (Fig. 1) in the datapaths of the adversarial panda
and monkey images. With the use of the developed multi-level
visualization, we identify the root cause of this misclassification
as both a failed detection of the outline of one of the panda’s ears
and a faulty detection of a monkey face in the adversarial panda
image using the target DNN.
Technically, AEVis aims to disclose the prediction process of
a DNN by extracting and visualizing the datapaths for adversarial
and normal examples, especially focusing on illustrating how these
datapaths diverge and merge.
To achieve this aim, we first formulate the datapath extraction
as a subset selection problem, which aims to select a minimum
set of neurons that can maintain the predictions of a set of
examples. As neurons in a DNN sometimes have similar roles,
there is randomness in selecting neurons in the datapath extraction
process. As a result, the uniqueness of an example’s extracted
datapath cannot be guaranteed. Moreover, the randomness hinders
the detection of the diverging and merging patterns in the extracted
datapaths. To reduce the randomness, we introduce the constraint
that it is desirable for the datapaths of adversarial and normal
examples to share common feature maps (a set of neurons that
share the same weights in a DNN). To extract the datapaths
for large DNNs, we approximate the subset selection problem
as a continuous optimization that can be efficiently solved by
constructing and training a neural network [12].
Second, we have developed a multi-level visualization that
illustrates how the extracted datapaths diverge and merge in the
prediction process. In particular, at the network-level, we have
created a river-based visualization to provide an overview of
the diverging and merging patterns of datapaths. At a detected
diverging/merging point (layer level), we employ a treemap-based
set visualization to illustrate the neuron groups at this layer and
their belonging to different datapaths. This helps experts determine
the critical neurons that cause the diverging and merging patterns.
In addition, we have enhanced the multi-level visualization with a
set of rich interactions that enable experts to effectively analyze the
cause of diverging/merging of datapaths. For example, we allow
experts to interactively analyze the contribution of neurons in one
layer to those of another deeper layer in order to disclose the root
cause of a diverging/merging pattern in the compared datapaths.
The paper is an extension of our previous work [17], in which
datapaths of examples are extracted and illustrated. In this paper,
we address the problem of merging patterns that were not detected
in our previous method. We provide a better overview of diverging
and merging between the datapaths of examples. In addition, the
root cause of such patterns is analyzed more deeply with our refined
analysis workflow. To evaluate the usefulness of the new system, we
re-invited one expert in our previous work and conducted a deeper
analysis of the same two adversarial image pairs, panda-monkey
(Sec. 6.2.1) and cannon-racket (Sec. 6.2.2). These improvements
come from the following technical contributions:
• A constrained datapath extraction algorithm to extract
datapaths while preserving their diverging and merging
patterns.
• A river-based visualization to provide an overview of how
datapaths diverge and merge at the network level and a refined
layer-level visualization to reveal the feature maps of interest.
• A contribution analysis method to iteratively investigate the
contribution of neurons between two layers and help experts
analyze the root cause of diverging/merging in certain layers.
In this paper, we focus on analyzing adversarial examples
generated for convolutional neural networks (CNNs), because
CNNs are among the most widely-used networks, and most of
the current adversarial example generation methods focus on
attacking CNNs [10]. Our method can also be used to analyze
adversarial examples for other deep networks that use CNNs as the
key components.
2 RELATED WORK
In the field of visual analytics, a number of methods have been
developed to illustrate the working mechanism of a variety
of DNNs, such as CNN [18], [19], [20], RNN [21], [22],
[23], [24], deep generative models [25], [26], [27], and deep
reinforcement learning models [28]. Hohman et al. [29] presented
a comprehensive survey to summarize the state-of-the-art visual
analysis methods for explainable deep learning. Existing methods
can be categorized into three classes: network-centric [30], [31],
[32], instance-centric [20], [33], [34], [35], and hybrid [36], [37].
Network-centric methods. Network-centric methods help ex-
plore the entire network structure of a DNN, illustrating the
roles of neurons/neuron connections/layers in the training/test
process. In the pioneering work, Tzeng et al. [31] employed a DAG
visualization to illustrate the neurons and their connections. This
method can illustrate the structure of a small neural network but
suffers from severe visual clutter when visualizing state-of-the-art
DNNs. To solve this problem, Liu et al. [30] developed a scalable
3visual analysis tool, CNNVis, based on clustering techniques. It
helps explore the roles of neurons in a deep CNN and diagnose
failed training processes. Wongsuphasawat et al. [32] developed a
tool with a scalable graph visualization to present the dataflow of
a DNN. To produce a legible graph visualization, they applied a
set of graph transformations that converts the low-level graph of
dataflow to the high-level structure of a DNN.
The aforementioned methods help experts better understand
the network structure, but they are less capable of explaining the
predictions of individual examples.
Instance-centric methods. To address the aforementioned issue,
researchers made several recent attempts that focus on instances.
These attempts aim at analyzing the learning behavior of a DNN
revealed by the instances. A widely-used method is feeding a set of
instances into a DNN and visualizing the corresponding log data,
such as the activation or the final predictions.
For example, Rauber et al. [33] designed a compact visual-
ization to reveal how the internal activation of training examples
evolves during a training process. They used t-SNE [38] to project
the high-dimensional activation maps of training examples in each
snapshot onto a 2D plane. The projected points are connected
by 2D trails to provide an overview of the activation during the
whole training process. The method successfully demonstrated how
different classes of instances are gradually distinguished by the
target DNN. In addition to internal activation, the final predictions
of instances can also help experts analyze the instance relationships.
For example, the tool Blocks [20] utilizes a confusion matrix to
visualize the final predictions of a large number of instances. To
reduce the visual clutter caused by a large number of instances and
classes, researchers enhanced the confusion matrix using techniques
such as non-linear color mapping and halo-based visual boosting.
The enhanced confusion matrix was able to disclose the confusion
pattern among different classes of instances and further indicated
the learning behavior of a target CNN.
The above methods can provide an overview of a large number
of instances and help experts analyze their relationships. However,
the prediction process of individual instances is less considered.
Compared with these macro-level methods, our method focuses on
the micro-level and targets the prediction processes of a set of in-
stances (usually a few to dozens). The prediction processes of these
instances are visualized using a multi-level datapath visualization.
Revealing the prediction processes enables experts to analyze the
root cause of the misclassification of adversarial examples.
Hybrid methods. The hybrid methods combine the advantages
of network-centric and instance-centric methods. Like instance-
centric methods, the hybrid methods also feed the target instances
into the network and extract log data such as activation maps. The
extracted log data is often visualized in the context of the network
structure, which provides visual hints to select and explore the
data of interest, e.g., the activation in a specific layer. Visualizing
the log data in the context of network structure also helps experts
explore the data flow from the network input to the output [39].
There are several papers making progress in this direction.
For example, Hartley et al. [36] developed an interactive node-
link visualization to show the activation in a DNN. Although
this method is able to illustrate detailed activation on feature
maps, it suffers from severe visual clutter when dealing with
large CNNs. To solve this problem, Kahng et al. [37] developed
ActiVis to interpret large-scale DNNs and their results. They
employed a multiple coordinated visualization to facilitate experts
in comparing activation among examples. The above works mainly
focus on exploring the prediction process of normal examples.
Recently, there is an emerging need in safety-critical fields to
analyze adversarial examples of DNNs. While machine learning
researchers have developed some holistic views on understanding
the existence of adversarial examples [13], [14], there is still a
lack of visualization tools to analyze the details. In response to
this need, we developed AEVis [17] to analyze the root cause of
misclassifications produced by malicious adversarial examples.
In particular, we developed a datapath extraction method to extract
critical neurons and their connections in the prediction process. To
enable experts to explore the extracted datapaths, we designed a
multi-level visualization that presented datapaths from the high-
level network structure to the detailed neuron activation.
As an extension of our previous work [17], this paper re-
identifies the central analytical task as analyzing the diverging
and merging patterns of normal and adversarial examples. Based
on this task, we developed a constrained datapath extraction
method that better preserves the diverging and merging patterns
of normal and adversarial examples. We also enhanced the whole
analysis workflow by introducing several useful interactions, such
as activation analysis and contribution analysis. These interactions
enable the experts to gradually investigate the major reason for
this diverging/merging pattern and thus help them analyze the
misclassification of adversarial examples.
3 THE DESIGN OF AEVIS
The development of AEVis was in collaboration with the machine
learning team that won first place in the NIPS 2017 non-targeted
adversarial attack and targeted adversarial attack competitions,
which aimed at attacking CNNs [40], [41]. Despite the promising
results they achieved, the experts found the research process
inefficient and inconvenient, especially in terms of the explanation
of the model outputs. In their research process, a key step was to
explain the misclassification introduced by adversarial examples.
Understanding why an error has been made helps the experts
identify the model weakness and further design a more effective
attack/defense method. The experts thus desire a tool that can assist
them in understanding the prediction process of the target CNN.
3.1 Requirement Analysis
We have identified the following high-level requirements based on
previous research and discussions with two experts (E1 and E2)
from the winning team of the NIPS 2017 competition.
R1 - Extracting the datapaths for adversarial and normal
examples. Both experts expressed the need for extracting the
datapaths of adversarial examples, which can disclose the prediction
process of adversarial examples and thus serves as the basis for
analyzing why the adversarial examples were misclassified. In a
CNN, different neurons learn to detect different features [42],
and play different roles for the prediction of an example. E1
said that only analyzing the datapath can greatly reduce their
effort by allowing them to only focus on critical neurons rather
than having to examine all of them. In addition to the datapaths
for adversarial examples, E1 emphasized the need for extracting
datapaths for normal examples simultaneously. He commented
that as an adversarial example is often generated by slightly
perturbing the pixel values of a normal image, there must be
similarities between the two extracted datapaths. Considering the
similarity during the datapath extraction process will help extract
more meaningful datapaths for comparison during the analysis.
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Figure 2: AEVis system overview. (a) Input of the AEVis system; (b) the datapath extraction module; (c) the datapath visualization
module that illustrates the extracted datapaths at the network-, layer-, and neuron-level.
R2 - Comparing the datapaths of adversarial and normal
examples. As mentioned before, an adversarial example is often
generated by adding unperceivable noise to a normal example,
and thus there is little difference from the normal image in the
input space. However, their prediction results are different. The
experts are interested in how they diverge into different predictions.
For example, E2 commented, “I want to know whether there are
some critical ‘diverging points’ for the different predictions or they
accumulate gradually layer by layer through the network.” To this
end, E2 wanted to compare the datapaths of normal source examples
and adversarial examples. Triggered by E2, E1 added that it was
interesting to compare the datapath of an adversarial example (e.g.,
a panda image that is misclassified as a monkey) with that of normal
target examples (e.g., normal monkey images). Such comparisons
help understand how these very different images “merge” into the
same prediction (e.g., the monkey). The need for visual comparison
is consistent with the findings of previous research [43], [44], [45].
R3 - Exploring datapaths at different levels. In a large CNN,
a datapath often contains millions of neurons and connections.
Directly presenting all neurons in a datapath will induce severe
visual clutter. E1 commented, “I cannot examine all the neurons
in a datapath because there are too many of them. Instead, I often
start by selecting an important layer based on my knowledge and
examine the neurons in that layer to analyze the learned features and
the activation of these neurons. The problem is that when dealing
with a new architecture, I may not know which layer to start with.
Thus, I have to examine a bunch of layers, which is very tedious.”
He advocated for the idea of providing an overview of the datapath
with visual guidance to facilitate experts in selecting the layer of
interest. The requirement of providing an overview of a CNN aligns
well with previous research [17], [32], [37]. Although the overview
of a datapath facilitates experts in finding the layer of interest, it
is not enough to diagnose the root cause of the wrong prediction.
The experts said that a link between the overview of a datapath
and the detailed neuron activation is required, which helps them
identify the most important neurons that lead to misclassification.
To summarize, it is desirable to provide a multi-level exploration
mechanism that allows experts to zoom into the neurons of interest
gradually. Previous research also indicates that visual analytics for
deep learning benefits from multi-level visualization [17], [37].
R4 - Examining how neurons contribute to each other in a
datapath. Finding a diverging or merging point is not the end
of the analysis. To develop effective defense methods, we must
disclose how such divergence or merging happens. As the data
flows from previous layers to the current diverging or merging
point, a practical method of finding the root cause is tracing back to
the previous layers and examining how the neurons there contribute
to the neurons at the diverging or merging point. E1 commented,
“When I find a neuron or feature map that performs very differently
for an adversarial and a normal example, I’m interested in the cause
of this difference. For example, it is useful to know whether it was
caused by the neurons in the previous layer or even the neurons in
a far-away layer due to the skip-connections [9] in modern CNNs.”
Therefore, we need to analyze how neurons contribute to each
other in a DNN. Previous research also indicates that presenting
the contributions among neurons is important for understanding
the outputs and roles of neurons [17].
3.2 System Overview
Driven by the requirements suggested by these experts, we have
developed a visual analysis tool, AEVis, to help experts analyze
the root cause of the robustness issues arising from adversarial
examples. It consists of the following two parts.
• A datapath extraction module that extracts the critical
neurons and their connections for the predictions of adversarial
and normal examples (R1).
5• A datapath visualization module that enables a multi-level
(R3) visual comparison (R2) of the extracted datapaths and
provides rich interactions (R4) to analyze the root cause of a
misclassification.
As shown in Fig. 2 (a), AEVis takes a trained CNN and the ex-
amples to be analyzed as its input. The examples usually include the
adversarial examples, normal source examples, and normal target
examples. Given the examples and the CNN, the datapath extraction
module extracts the critical neurons and their connections that are
responsible for the predictions of the examples (Fig. 2 (b)). The ex-
tracted datapaths are then fed into the visualization module (Fig. 2
(c)), which supports the navigation and comparison of the datapaths
from the high-level layers to the detailed neuron activation.
4 DATAPATH EXTRACTION
4.1 Basic Problem Formulation
Extracting datapaths of adversarial and normal examples is the
basis for analyzing why an adversarial example is misclassified
(R1). The key challenge is to identify the critical neurons in the
prediction process. Once the critical neurons have been identified,
selecting the corresponding connections to form the datapath is
straightforward. Critical neurons are those that highly contribute
to the final prediction. In other words, by only combining the
critical neurons and corresponding connections, the prediction
of an example will not be changed. Therefore, we aim to select
a minimized subset of neurons that can maintain the original
prediction. Accordingly, we formulate critical neurons extraction
as a subset selection problem:
Nopt = argmin
Ns⊆N
(p(x)− p(x;Ns))2 + λ|Ns|. (1)
The first term is to keep the original prediction, and the second term
ensures the selection of a minimized subset of neurons. Specifically,
N is the set of neurons in a CNN, Ns is a subset of N , Nopt
is the optimized subset consisting of critical neurons, p(x) is the
prediction of example x, and p(x;Ns) is the prediction if we only
consider the neuron subset Ns. To measure the difference between
two predictions, we adopt the widely used `2 norm. |Ns| is the
size of Ns and λ is used to balance the two terms. Compared with
our previous work, we change the second term from |Ns|2 to |Ns|.
With this change, we are able to accelerate the entire optimization
process by obtaining a minimized subset of neurons more easily
according to the Lasso algorithm [46].
The large search space in Eq. (1) hinders a direct solution,
which is mainly due to a large number of neurons in a CNN (usually
millions). To reduce the search space, we utilize the weight-sharing
property in CNNs [1] and group neurons into a set of feature maps.
Specifically, in a CNN, neurons in a feature map share the same
weights, and thus learn to detect the same feature. Making use of
this characteristic, we replace the problem of critical neuron selec-
tion with feature map selection and reformulate the problem as:
Fopt = argmin
Fs⊆F
(p(x)− p(x;Fs))2 + λ|Fs|, (2)
where F is the set of feature maps in a CNN, and Fs is a subset
of F .
4.2 Constrained Datapath Extraction
The above method is successful in extracting the critical feature
maps for one example but sometimes creates difficulty when com-
paring datapaths of adversarial and normal examples, especially
(b)
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Figure 3: The cause of randomness in datapath extraction. (a) two
feature maps detect the same feature (a deer head); (b) there are
two equivalent candidate datapaths for the deer image.
in the detection of merging patterns [17]. After discussions with the
domain experts (E1 and E2) and conducting several experiments, we
find that the difficulty is mainly due to the randomness in datapath
extraction. Specifically, different feature maps in a CNN may have
very similar roles, i.e., detecting nearly the same features [3]. It
means that the optimized datapath for an individual adversarial or
normal example may not be unique, given the many feature maps
with equivalent roles. Thus, extracting a datapath can be treated as
sampling one from equivalently good candidate datapaths, which
introduces randomness into the datapath extraction. Extracting
datapaths that share common feature maps may lead to two feature
map subsets that lack common feature maps. As a result, we
may over-estimate the difference between two extracted datapaths,
which hinders the detection of the diverging and especially the
merging patterns.
To illustrate the above analysis, we trained a 6-layer CNN on
the CIFAR10 dataset [47]. The network contains 5 convolutional
layers and 1 fully connected layer. After training, two equivalently
good datapaths for a deer image (the difference between values
of Eq. (2) is less than 0.127) were extracted. By examining the
feature maps in the two datapaths, we found two feature maps that
detected the same feature (a deer head, Fig. 3 (a)) but belonged
to different datapaths (Fig. 3 (b)). The above experiment illustrates
that feature maps in a CNN may detect the same feature and
thus perform similar roles. As a result, there is randomness in the
datapath extraction process. This randomness hinders the detection
of diverging and merging patterns when comparing datapaths.
To faithfully disclose the diverging and merging patterns,
we need to reduce the randomness in datapath extraction. The
randomness is mainly caused by the lack of preference among the
feature maps that detect the same features. To tackle this issue,
we introduce additional constraints into the datapath extraction
process, to prioritize the extraction of datapaths that share common
feature maps.
Accordingly, the datapaths F 1opt, ..., F
i
opt, ..., F
n
opt for exam-
ples x1, ..., xi, ..., xn are extracted by optimizing:
F 1opt, ..., F
i
opt, ..., F
n
opt = argmin
F is⊆F
∑
i
Li+ γ
∑
i,j
dis(F is , F
j
s ),
(3)
where the first term Li = (p(xi)− p(xi;F is))2+λ|F is | measures
how good the datapath is for the i-th example xi. The second
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Figure 4: The analysis workflow of the diverging pattern. The brown color represents the first step analysis, and the purple color indicates
the subsequent analysis, which is iterative.
term dis(F is , F
j
s ) is the distance to measure the difference
between the datapaths for the i-th and j-th example, which is
defined in Eq. (5). Adding the constraint helps extract datapaths
that share common feature maps. γ is used to balance the two
terms. Although this method is theoretically sound, in practice, we
find that it is difficult to maintain all the predicted labels of the
examples, a fundamental requirement for explaining the prediction
process. The root cause of the problem is the complexity in jointly
finding optimized datapaths for different examples. To solve this
problem, we instead approximate the joint optimization into a
chain of simpler conditional optimizations. We first obtain the
datapath for one example (e.g., the adversarial example to analyze)
and iteratively obtain others by treating the previously calculated
datapaths as constraints. In particular, for the i-th example, we
solve:
F iopt = argmin
F is⊆F
Li + γ
i−1∑
j=1
dis(F is , F
j
opt). (4)
To efficiently solve the above subset selection problem, we
approximate this NP-hard discrete optimization [48] with a
continuous optimization:
ziopt = argmin
zi∈[0,1]n
L(xi, zi) + γ
i−1∑
j=1
dis(zjopt, z
i),
L(xi, zi)) = (p(xi)− p(xi; zi))2 + λ|zi|,
dis(zjopt, z
i) = ||zjopt − zi||2,
(5)
where zi = [zi1, · · · , zin] and zik ∈ [0, 1] is the contribution of the
k-th feature map in the datapath of the i-th example xi. We apply
the commonly-used `2 norm to measure the difference between
two datapaths (the second term in Eq. (4)). Eq. (5) is further solved
by constructing and training a DNN as in [12]. In particular, we
embed the variable zi into the target DNN and train the network
on the target adversarial/normal examples by stochastic gradient
descent (SGD).
5 DATAPATH VISUALIZATION
5.1 Overview
An extracted datapath usually contains millions of neurons and
even more connections, which prohibits efficient examination of
the datapath or discovery of the merging-diverging patterns. To
help experts systematically investigate the extracted datapaths, we
have designed a multi-level visualization to facilitate the datapath
analysis from the high-level network structure to the detailed neuron
activation (R3). Accordingly, it consists of three major visualization
components at the network-, layer-, and neuron-levels.
Network-level visualization of data flows. As shown in Fig. 2
(c), the network-level visualization provides an overview of the
extracted datapaths, discloses the potential diverging and merging
points, and further guides experts in selecting a layer of interest for
examination (R2). Compared with our previous work, we replace
the dot-plot-based network-level visualization with a river-based
visual metaphor, which has better scalability and is more effective
in depicting diverging and merging patterns.
Layer-level visualization of feature maps. When an expert
identifies a layer of interest (e.g., a diverging or merging point),
s/he then zooms in to examine the critical feature maps in that
layer (Fig. 2 (c)). For a diverging point, the unique feature maps
of each datapath lie in the center of experts’ analysis. For a
merging point, the shared feature maps between/among datapaths
are critical to the analysis. To help experts more quickly find the
important and informative feature maps, we use two types of filling
styles to encode the activation difference (solid filling , Fig. 2A)
and contribution (dotted filling , Fig. 1FA). The higher filling
represents a larger value.
Neuron-level visualization of learned features. When an expert
finds a feature map of interest, AEVis helps him/her understand
what features the neurons of interest have learned in the prediction
process. Following previous research [3], [20], we employ the
learned features of the neurons (Fig. 1A) and their activation
maps (Fig. 1C) to facilitate the understanding. The activation of
7a neuron in a feature map is encoded by the color. Darker green
indicates a higher value.
Analysis workflows. These three visualizations work together to
support a progressive analysis of adversarial examples, which helps
experts understand the root cause of the divergence between normal
source examples and the corresponding adversarial examples, as
well as the merging between the adversarial examples and the
normal target examples. Fig. 4 shows the typical workflow for
analyzing a diverging pattern. It starts from the network-level
visualization where a diverging pattern (Fig. 4A) with several layer
groups is identified first. Then with the layer-level visualization
and activation analysis, the salient feature map is discovered. Next,
by analyzing the learned features and activation in the neuron-level
visualization, the expert can identify an area of interest in the
focused feature map, which is sent to the contribution analysis
module. This module computes the contribution to the activation
of the selected neurons from corresponding neurons in previous
feature maps. Finally, by examining the contribution of the feature
maps in the diverging pattern, the expert gradually investigates the
major reason for this divergence. In the merging pattern analysis,
instead of using activation analysis, we use contribution analysis as
the first step. This is because the merging point is usually followed
by the prediction. Contribution analysis helps identify the most
important learned feature for the final prediction.
With this exploratory analysis, the potential cause for the wrong
predictions is disclosed to facilitate experts in their task of noise
robustness analysis. In the below sections, we focus on introducing
the network-level visualization, the layer-level visualization, and
contribution analysis.
5.2 Network-level visualization
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Figure 5: Dot plot.
In our previous work [17], we employed a
dot plot to visualize the difference between
two datapaths. As shown in Fig. 5, each
rectangle represents a layer group, where
layers are hierarchically grouped according
to the hierarchical computation graph de-
fined in the widely-used TensorFlow Graph
Visualization [32]. Each dot in the plot
represents the activation similarity between
two datapaths of a layer. As a result, the dot plot is combined with
the layer group to illustrate the similarities between the extracted
datapaths of each layer in each layer group. The position of a
dot on the x-axis denotes the similarity value, from 0 (left) to 1
(right). The method has been demonstrated to be useful in detecting
the diverging/merging point of two datapaths (e.g., the datapaths
of adversarial panda and normal panda images). However, we
have received feedback from the experts that the dot-plot-based
visualization is less intuitive in revealing the overall evolution
pattern of datapath merging and diverging as well as the transition
between them. Moreover, it cannot compare three datapaths, which
is specifically requested by the experts. The experts said that in
analysis, they often needed to examine the adversarial examples in
the context of both normal source examples (e.g., panda) and
normal target examples (e.g., monkey) to identify the critical
diverging/merging points.
To tackle these issues, we have developed a river-based visual
metaphor [49], which is inspired by the natural phenomenon of
a river merging and diverging along a riverbed. The river-based
visualization has been proven effective at depicting diverging and
merging patterns over time [49]. As shown in Fig. 6, we use a curve
to represent a datapath. Considering the complexity of the current
system, we do not use the curve width to encode extra information,
and thus the width is always the same. The distance between the
curves represents the similarity between two datapaths. The smaller
the distance, the more similar the two datapaths. When comparing
three datapaths (adversarial, normal source, and normal target
examples), we employ a rule-based method to highlight diverging
and merging patterns. In particular, the datapath of the adversarial
example stays in the middle with the other two (source and target)
on either side (Fig. 6). The screen distance is proportional to the
datapath distance d1 (source-target). The position of the datapath
of the adversarial example is determined by retaining the ratio of
d2 (adversarial - source) and d3 (adversarial - target). To better
reveal how data flows in the network, we embed the river-based
visualization into the DAG visualization representing the network
structure (Fig. 6). With this combination, the merging (Fig. 6
(a)), diverging (Fig. 6 (b)), and transition between datapaths can
be easily recognized by examining the distance changes. (Fig. 6
(c)). For example, in Fig. 6 (a), the distance between the blue
curve (normal panda) and the orange curve (adversarial example)
increases. This indicates that the critical neurons of these two
datapaths are gradually becoming less similar to each other, creating
a diverging pattern. While in Fig. 6 (b), the distance between the
orange curve (adversarial example) and the purple curve (normal
monkey) decreases. This indicates that the critical neurons of these
two datapaths are gradually becoming more similar to each other,
creating a merging pattern. Fig. 6 (c) shows a transition process
from the diverging between a normal panda and an adversarial
panda to the merging of an adversarial panda and a normal monkey.
Revealing these patterns helps experts quickly locate the layer of
interest for further investigation.
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Figure 6: Visualization of three datapaths, with the illustration
of (a) the diverging pattern, (b) the merging pattern, and (c) the
transition from diverging to merging.
5.3 Layer-Level Visualization
When examining a layer of interest, such as a layer with a diverging
or merging pattern, the critical feature maps of that layer (Fig. 2
(c)) are important for understanding the key features learned in
that layer. These feature maps and corresponding learned features
are generally useful for understanding why an adversarial example
diverges from its original category and merges into another category.
As a result, the unique and shared feature maps between/among
datapaths are expected to be encoded and visualized clearly. To
this end, we employ a treemap-based visualization to describe the
set relationships among the feature maps of different datapaths.
The basic idea is illustrated in Fig. 7. In the figure, (a) shows three
sets of feature maps belonging to three datapaths (normal panda,
adversarial panda, and normal monkey), and their set relations. We
8first compute the shared (intersection) and unique parts of the three
sets (Fig. 7 (b)). Then a hierarchy is built based on the set inclusion
relationships (Fig. 7 (c)). To have more space for displaying the
shared and unique parts and distinguishing them clearly, we put the
shared parts into the largest set with more feature maps. Finally, the
feature map sets and their intersection relationships are visualized
with a squarified treemap layout [50] (Fig. 7 (d)).
To better reveal the relationships between the shared and unique
parts of different datapaths, the treemap cells of the shared parts
are placed in a position that is as close as possible to every treemap
cell of related feature map sets. For example, the shared part, S,
of feature map sets A, B, and C are placed near the centers of the
three related treemap cells representing A, B, and C (Fig. 7 (d)).
Accordingly, the treemap layout is formulated as an optimization
problem with the goal of placing the treemap cells of shared sets
close to the center of the cells of related sets:
min
∑
si∈{0,1},
∑
i si≥2
(fe( ∩
i:si=1
Ai)− fm
i:si=1
(fe(Ai)))
2, (6)
where ∩
i:si=1
Ai is the set that contains all feature maps shared by
Ai, for all si = 1. si is the status variable of Ai. si = 1 indicates
that Ai contains the shared part ∩
i:si=1
Ai, while si = 0 means
that Ai does not contain this set. fe(·) denotes the center of the
treemap cell representing a set, while fm
i:si=1
(·) is the mean of the
centers. Accordingly, the first term represents the center of the
shared feature map set ∩
i:si=1
Ai, and the second term represents
the mean of the centers of the feature map sets that share ∩
i:si=1
Ai.
This optimized treemap-based visualization can clearly reveal
the shared and unique feature maps on the datapaths of interest,
which is useful for investigating the roles of different types of
feature maps (e.g., unique or shared feature maps) in the prediction.
For example, the experts are interested in examining the unique
feature maps on each datapath for a diverging point. While for
a layer with a merging pattern, the shared feature maps among
datapaths are critical for the prediction analysis.
To facilitate the identification of salient feature maps, two
types of encoding are employed for activation and contribution,
respectively.
Encoding the activation difference. We select the maximum
neuron activation in a feature map to represent its activation,
with the aim of emphasizing the most salient feature detected
by the feature map. The solid filling style is used to encode the
activation difference between two datapaths. Taking datapaths A
and B as an example, their activation difference is acti(A)-acti(B).
The larger the value, the higher the filling, which indicates that the
learned feature is more salient in A than in B.
Encoding the contribution. A subset of neurons in a specific
feature map can be selected as an area of interest (Fig. 1D).
Experts can trace how corresponding neurons in previous layers
contribute to the activations of the selected neurons. This is useful
for identifying the key learned features that lead to diverging or
merging of datapaths. In addition, to facilitate the analysis of the
diverging/merging patterns for adversarial examples, it is essential
to understand how feature maps at each layer contribute to the
final prediction. In our visualization, the dotted filling style is
employed to encode the contribution from corresponding neurons
in previous layers to the activation of the neurons in the focused
area or to the final prediction. The higher filling represents a larger
contribution value.
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Figure 7: Illustration on how to create a feature map visualization
for three datapaths. (a) The three sets of feature maps at a selected
layer; (b) The intersection relationships among the sets; (c) A
hierarchy based on the set inclusion relationships; (d) The treemap-
based visualization of feature maps.
5.4 Contribution Analysis
When an expert finds a pattern of interest (e.g., a critical feature
map in a diverging point or merging point), s/he often wants to
analyze the major cause that leads to the pattern. To this end, we
have developed a contribution analysis method to compute the
contribution of the previous feature maps to the neuron activation
of the feature map of interest (target feature map).
Initially, the contribution analysis is performed based on the
whole target feature map. We formulate this problem as a subset
selection problem. It aims to select a minimum number of feature
maps that can maximally preserve the activation of the target
feature map. This formulation is similar to the datapath extraction
discussed in Sec. 4. As a result, we also employ the continuous
optimization method to select the feature maps and compute the
corresponding contribution. In particular, we replace the first term
in Eq. (5) with the preservation of the activation of the target feature
map:
ziopt = argmin
ziprev∈[0,1]n
(f(xi)− f(xi; ziprev))2
+ λ|ziprev|+ γ
∑
j∈[1,m],j 6=i
||zjprev − ziprev||2,
(7)
where f(xi) is the neuron activation of the target feature map on
example xi and f(xi; zjprev) is the corresponding neuron activation
in consideration of the previous feature map contributions zjprev .
m is the number of datapaths being analyzed. This optimization
problem can be solved similarly with our proposed algorithm in
Sec. 4.
When using this contribution analysis method to analyze the
adversarial noise, we discover an issue. As shown in Fig. 8 (a),
if all the neurons of the target feature map are considered, some
irrelevant feature maps, such as FM1 and FM2, are ranked highest,
while the relevant one, FM3, is ranked third. This is because, in
9addition to the feature that is misled by the adversarial noise, other
irrelevant features with high neuron activation, are also considered.
These irrelevant features may trigger several irrelevant feature maps
and rank them higher.
To tackle this issue, we allow experts to only select neurons
(Fig.8A) that are highly activated on the adversarial noise and
examine the influence of other feature maps on these selected
neurons. For example, when an expert examines a feature map
of interest (e.g., Fig. 1C), s/he finds that a certain area of the
example is identified as a panda’s ear. S/he then checks the previous
layers to investigate the reason why this area is activated by the
neurons. Therefore, it is useful for the expert to focus on the
neurons in this area and check the contribution of the previous
feature maps to these selected neurons in the prediction. The key
challenge of this problem is to calculate the contribution of the
corresponding neurons in each of the previous feature maps. Here
the corresponding neurons correspond to the selected neurons in
the target feature map. Similarly, we also aim to select a minimum
number of feature maps that can maximally preserve the activation
of the selected neurons in the target feature map. Accordingly, we
change the optimization variable zs in Eq. (7) from the whole
feature map to the corresponding neurons:
ziopt,p = argmin
ziprev,p∈[0,1]n
(f(xi)− f(xi; ziprev,p))2 + λ|ziprev,p|
+ γ
∑
j∈[1,m],j 6=i
||zjprev,p − ziprev,p||2, (8)
where zprev,p = [z1prev,p, · · · , znprev,p]. zkprev,p ∈ [0, 1] approxi-
mates the contribution of the neurons in the focused area of k-th
feature map to the activation of the selected neurons in the target
feature map.
The top 3 most contributed feature maps identified by the new
method are shown in (Fig.8 (b), where the most relevant one, FM3,
ranks first.
(a) Select the whole feature map
FM1, cntr=1.0 FM2, cntr=0.9 FM3, cntr=0.6
FM3, cntr=1.0 FM1, cntr=0.5 FM2, cntr=0.0
Learned features of the top 3 feature maps
Learned features of the top 3 feature maps
A
(b) Select  partial neurons with high activation
Figure 8: The top 3 most contributed feature maps identified by
considering a) the whole feature map of interest; b) part of the
feature map of interest.
6 EVALUATION
We first quantitatively evaluated the effectiveness of the proposed
constrained datapath extraction method in comparison with a
previous state-of-the-art method, the DGR method [12]. We then
demonstrated through a case study how AEVis helped the analysis
of the root cause for misclassification of adversarial examples.
Expert E1, one of the two experts who participated in the evaluation
of the previous version of AEVis [17], was invited again to evaluate
the usefulness of the new system. The CNN used for evaluation is
a pretrained ResNet-101 [9], which contains 101 layers and is a
state-of-the-art CNN for image classification.
6.1 Quantitative Analysis
As there is no ground-truth for datapaths, the effectiveness of the
datapath extraction method is measured by the ability to detect the
diverging-merging patterns between the extracted datapaths. Two
datasets with different scales were used for this evaluation. One
dataset contains all the images of 10 randomly selected classes
(shown at the top of Table 1) from ImageNet ILSVRC 2012 [51].
The other contains 100 classes, with 10 randomly selected images
in each class. We used a state-of-the-art attacking method, namely,
the momentum iterative fast gradient sign method [40], [52], to
generate an adversarial example for each image in the datasets.
From the classification results of these adversarial images, for each
class that was mistakenly classified into, we further sampled 20
target images from the original ImageNet ILSVRC 2012 dataset.
Then for each misclassified adversarial image, we constructed
20 triplets of normal source/adversarial/normal target images and
extracted datapaths for each triplet.
As shown in Fig. 6, there is a diverging point (LA) where the
datapath of the misclassified adversarial image gradually deviates
from the datapath of the normal source image, and gets closer to
that of the normal target image and merges with it at a point (LE),
resulting in the misclassification. Such a diverging followed by
a merging pattern (simplified as a diverging-merging pattern)
is an important characteristic indicating the misclassification of
adversarial images. The ability of the extracted datapaths to reflect
such patterns is thus used to evaluate the effectiveness of the
datapath extraction method.
To determine the occurrence of a diverging-merging pattern, we
calculated the difference in the distances between 1) the datapaths
of the adversarial and normal source images and 2) the datapaths
of the adversarial and normal target images. The difference at layer
i is calculated as:
diff(i) = ||zadvopt (i)−zsrcopt(i))||2−||zadvopt (i)−ztaropt(i)||2 (9)
where zadvopt , z
src
opt , and z
tar
opt denote datapaths of the adversarial ex-
ample, the normal source image that corresponds to the adversarial,
and the normal target image, respectively.
If the distance difference of the last r layers continues to
increase towards the end of the model, a diverging-merging
pattern is detected. Thus, we count the number of layers (nl)
that continuously increasing in the last r layers:
nl =
m∑
i=m−r+1
I(diff(i) > diff(i− 1)) (10)
where I(·) is an indicator function. It equals 1 if the predicate is
true, and 0 otherwise. m is the number of layers in the model, and
r is a number recommended by experts to set the minimum length
of the diverging-merging pattern (r = 8 in our experiments). Then
such a pattern is detected when nl = r and diff(m) reaches the
maximum.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the datapath extraction method,
we then defined the following score:
10
Dataset 1 Dataset 2
jeep schooner banana pizza panda goldfish rosehip snake tusker sunglass 100 class (average)
Top-1 Score DGR 0.000 0.038 0.039 0.059 0.051 0.006 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.029 0.011
Ours 0.017 0.076 0.058 0.078 0.061 0.029 0.045 0.025 0.021 0.057 0.042
Top-3 Score DGR 0.033 0.114 0.107 0.176 0.111 0.041 0.061 0.101 0.042 0.095 0.064
Ours 0.083 0.253 0.165 0.333 0.222 0.110 0.091 0.139 0.104 0.152 0.123
Top-5 Score DGR 0.067 0.177 0.117 0.275 0.172 0.076 0.091 0.215 0.083 0.162 0.123
Ours 0.133 0.468 0.204 0.647 0.404 0.174 0.136 0.291 0.167 0.248 0.209
Table 1: The top -1, -3, -5 scores on the 10-class and the 100-class datasets using DGR [12] and our method for datapath extraction.
Top-K score. For each misclassified adversarial example, we
sorted the corresponding target images in descending order ac-
cording to their datapath similarity (based on the distance defined
in Eq. (5), 1/dis) with the adversarial image. The top-K score is
calculated as the average number of diverging-merging patterns in
the top-K target-images of each adversarial example. The higher
the score, the better detection of the diverging-merging pattern
in the extracted datapaths, and thus more effective the datapath
extraction method.
We computed the top-1, top-3, and top-5 scores of our datapath
extraction method. For comparison, we also computed the scores
for the DGR method [12]. Table 1 shows the computed scores on
the 10 randomly selected classes in the first dataset. It can be seen
that our method performs better than the DGR method on all the
classes. We further computed the scores on the 100 classes in the
second dataset, and the average result shown in the last column of
Table 1 further verified the effectiveness of our method.
6.2 Case Study
We invited expert E1, to evaluate the usefulness of AEVis. As E1
participated in the aforementioned NIPS 2017 adversarial attack
competition, he was interested in using the same DEV dataset from
the competition [41]. He would like to see whether AEVis could
help him gain a better understanding of the misclassification of
adversarial examples. The DEV dataset contains 1000 images of
different classes, and for each image, we generated an adversarial
image using the non-targeted attacking method developed by the
winning team [40], [52].
To facilitate the analysis, we calculated an adversarial score for
each adversarial image using the method in [15]. A higher score
means a more obvious adversarial example. These scores, together
with the classification results, were presented to E1 for him to
select suitable adversarial examples for analysis. E1 was interested
in misclassified adversarial examples with medium scores, as he
commented, ‘Less obvious examples often contain subtle changes
with big influence’. After examining these uncertain adversarial
examples, E1 selected two images for further investigation: an
image of a panda head that had been misclassified as a guenon
monkey (I2 in Fig. 1), and an image of a cannon misclassified as a
racket (Fig. 12).
6.2.1 Panda image
To find and understand the root cause of this misclassification,
E1 selected the adversarial panda image (I2 in Fig. 1), the normal
panda image (I1 in Fig. 1), and 10 normal guenon monkey images
(I3 in Fig. 1) in the AEVis system. The datapaths of normal and
adversarial panda images and a representative monkey image were
then automatically extracted for further analysis. In particular,
the representative monkey image was selected from 10 randomly
sampled monkey images, among which it had the highest datapath
similarity with the adversarial panda image (Eq. 5).
Overview. The system first displayed the datapaths at the network-
level (Fig. 1 (b)). The distances among the three datapaths disclose
the diverging-merging patterns through the layers. Following the
dataflow in the overview, E1 found that the datapath of the
adversarial panda image began to deviate from the datapath of
the normal panda image at layer LA (Fig. 6), gradually got closer
to the datapath of the monkey image, and finally merged into it
at LE (Fig. 6). From LA to LE are the layers where the predictive
behaviors of neurons were misled by the adversarial noise. To better
understand the working mechanism of adversarial noise, he then
analyzed the misclassification from two aspects: the diverging
process of the adversarial image from the normal source image
(panda), and the merging process of the adversarial image into
the normal target images (monkey).
Diverging analysis. To analyze which feature maps in the datapath
of the adversarial example were critical for the divergence, E1
first expanded layer LC where the divergence became noticeably
large. The encoded value of each feature map was set as the
activation difference between the normal source and adversarial
images. A large difference indicates that the feature map has
detected its learned features in the normal source image but not
in the adversarial example. With this understanding, E1 directly
checked the feature map FC1, which had the largest activation
difference in LC. By examining the learned features (Fig. 1A) of
this feature map, he discovered that the neurons in this feature
map were trained to detect a black circle pattern that resembled
an ear or an eye of a panda (Fig. 1B and C). Such a pattern is
one of the unique characteristics of a panda and is thus critical for
its classification. Then looking at the activation maps (Fig. 1C),
E1 noticed that the neurons covering the ear area were correctly
activated for the normal panda image, indicating a successful
detection of this critical pattern. However, the same neurons were
not activated for the adversarial example. E1 considered this was
an important reason for the misclassification.
To analyze the root cause for this failed detection, E1 selected
the neurons covering the ear area to form an area of interest
(Fig. 1D) for a closer examination. He suspected the failed detection
Pan
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Figure 9: Activation of feature maps in (a) LA, (b) LD and (c) LE.
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Figure 10: E1’s analysis process from the deep layer LE to the shallow layer LB in order to find the major cause of merging.
was influenced by the feature maps from previous layers. He then
set the value encoded in each feature map as the ‘contribution’
to the selected one, i.e. the area of interest in FC1, and expanded
LA, the layer at the beginning of the diverging process. In the
treemap-based visualization at LA, E1 found that feature map FA
(Fig. 1 (b)) which had the largest contribution to the activation
difference in FC1. By examining its learned features (Fig. 1E),
E1 confirmed that it was trained for low-level detection of black-
white boundaries. The activation maps (Fig. 9 (a)) showed that
this feature was detected in the normal panda image but not in the
adversarial example. E1 speculated that this failed detection led to
the failed detection of the panda’s ear in FC1, and finally led to the
failed classification of the adversarial example as a panda.
To confirm his speculation, E1 repeated the analysis on LD and
LE. In these two layers, he selected several feature maps with a big
activation difference between the normal and adversarial images.
From the activation maps, he found more significant misses in the
detection of critical patterns in the adversarial example (Fig. 9 (b),
and (c)). Selecting the area of interest and tracing the contribution
back to LA, E1 identified the same feature map FA as the biggest
contributor to the failed detection in LD and LE. At this point,
E1 was convinced that the missing detection of the black-white
boundary in FA was the root cause for the failed detection of critical
patterns in higher levels that finally led to the failed classification
of the adversarial example as a panda.
Merging analysis. After analyzing the reason why the adversarial
example was not classified as a panda, E1 turned his attention
to why it was classified as a monkey. He suspected that the
same region that led to the failed classification of panda actually
contributed to its classification as a monkey. Therefore, he retained
the same area of interest and expanded layer LE (Fig. 6), the
merging point for the datapaths of the adversarial and the monkey
images. To find the feature maps that had the main contribution
to the misclassification, he set the encoded value of each feature
map as the ‘contribution’ to the prediction of the adversarial panda
image and identified the feature map (FE in Fig. 10 (c)) with the
largest contribution. After examining its learned features (Fig. 10
(c)(ii)), E1 discovered that it was trained to detect monkeys in
various situations. Comparing the activation maps of the adversarial
example and normal monkey image (Fig. 10 (c)(iii)), he found that
the monkey face was activated in the monkey image as expected.
However, it was hard to explain the activation at the top part of
the adversarial example. Intuitively, there were no indications of a
monkey in that part. Thus, E1 decided to trace back to the lower
levels to seek more clues.
Guided by the larger activation on the activation map of the
adversarial example, E1 first adjusted the area of interest to include
the most activated neurons at this layer (Fig. 1D), and then analyzed
the contributions to FE from the feature maps in previous layers.
In layer LC, he found feature map FC2 (Fig. 10 (b)), which had the
highest contribution to FE. After a closer look, the neurons in FC2
seemed to detect the face of a monkey (Fig. 10 (b)(ii)). Activation
on the monkey image was correctly located in the middle of the
monkey face, but in the adversarial panda image, it was again
located on the top right part as was the case in FE (Fig. 10(c)).
‘Are there patterns of a monkey face?’ With this question in mind,
E1 carefully compared the adversarial example and the monkey
image (Fig. 10 (b)(iii)). He found that for the adversarial example,
in the activated region, the dark strip with two lighter patches on
either side did resemble the look of a monkey’s nose with lighter
cheeks next to it.
However, the same pattern was present in the normal panda
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image, but it was not detected by the neurons in FC2. E1 thus
wanted to investigate the more fundamental cause for the detection.
Again, he adjusted the area of interest according to the activation
map and expanded the previous layer LB (Fig. 6). He identified
that feature map FB (Fig. 10 (a)) was in the datapath intersection
for both the adversarial and monkey images and had the largest
contribution to FC2. Examining the learned features of this feature
map (Fig. 10 (a)(ii)), E1 found that the neurons inside were trained
to identify the eyes of different animals. Further inspecting the
activation of the three images, he found that a small region with
the appearance of an eye was detected at the top right corner of the
adversarial panda image. (Fig. 11). And compared with the normal
image, this seemed attributed to the added adversarial noise. In
addition, the position of the ‘eye’ combined with the position of
the ‘nose’ detected in FE resembled the layout of a real monkey
face. At this point, E1 figured out the effect of the adversarial noise.
The top right corner of the adversarial panda image had some
similarities with a monkey’s face. In particular, the imperceptible
adversarial noise misled the model to detect a monkey’s eye first,
then the subtle changes in image layout misled the model to detect
a monkey’s face. It was like a domino effect and finally led to the
misclassification of the adversarial example as a monkey.
Figure 11: A small region with the appearance of an eye was
detected at the top right corner of the adversarial panda image.
Summary. From the above analysis, E1 summarized two effects
of the adversarial noise. The first one was that the outline of the
panda’s ear was affected by the noise, which led to the failed
detection of the ear and resulted in the large decrease of the
predicted probability of the panda class. The second one is that
the adversarial noise misled the model to detect a monkey’s eye in
the same region, which further led to the detection of a monkey’s
face. Then the probability of monkey class largely increased and
resulted in the final misclassification.
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Figure 12: Diverging analysis for an adversarial cannon image.
6.2.2 Cannon image
E1 carried out a similar examination on the adversarial cannon
image. Examining the datapaths of the normal and adversarial
cannon images and a representative racket image (Fig. 12), E1
first identified the diverging and merging points (LB and LC in
Fig. 12). To analyze the root cause for divergence, E1 followed the
same process as above. He first discovered the activation difference
between the normal and adversarial images on feature map FB1
that was trained to detect the wheel of a cannon (Fig. 12). He then
traced the failed detection to feature map FA in LA, where the
wheel shafts were not detected in the adversarial example (Fig. 12).
E1 speculated the added noise blurred the edges of the shafts
which resulted in the failed detection, and further led to the failed
detection of the wheel, and finally the misclassification.
A
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Figure 13: Merging analysis for adversarial cannon image.
To understand why the adversarial example was misclassified
as a racket, E1 turned his attention to the merging point LC, and
identified the feature map FC which had the largest contribution
to the misclassification (Fig. 13). Comparing the activation maps
(Fig. 13LC), he found two regions (Fig. 13A and B) that were
wrongly activated in the adversarial cannon image. Selecting each
region and tracing back to layer LB, E1 noticed the feature maps
that contributed the most to each of the regions were trained to
detect ‘net’ and ‘racket throat’ respectively (Fig. 13C and D). There
are similarities between the streaks on the ground and a racket
net, and between the gun mount and a racket throat. However, the
added noise in the adversarial image creates a stronger activation
in the two feature maps (Fig. 13LB). E1 thus speculated that the
stronger activation together with the failed detection of the wheel
misled the model to detect the net and the throat of a racket in
adjacent regions, which finally led to the misclassification of the
adversarial image.
7 DISCUSSION
AEVis can effectively illustrate the prediction mechanism of
adversarial examples and help discover the root cause that leads
to incorrect predictions. However, it still has several limitations,
which may shed light on future research directions.
Time complexity. The datapath extraction usually takes a few
minutes and is computed offline. The contribution analysis is the
only part that cannot be pre-computed because the contribution is
calculated based on the selected neurons. It usually takes about 5
seconds to calculate the contribution using SGD to solve Eq. (8).
To accelerate the process, we can use the quadratic approximation
from our previous work [17], which is faster (computation time
< 1s) but less accurate. Since our target users (machine learning
experts) focus more on analysis accuracy, the SGD-based solution
13
is set as default. Users can switch to the approximated contribution
analysis in the interface.
Visual scalability. We have demonstrated that AEVis is able to
analyze a state-of-the-art CNN (ResNet101), which has 101 layers
and is much deeper than traditional CNNs (e.g., VGG-Net). More
recently, deeper CNNs with thousands of layers [9] have been
developed. When handling such deep neural networks, the layers
of interest at low levels of the hierarchy are difficult to fit in one
screen, even with the help of our segmented DAG. A possible
solution to alleviate this issue is to employ a mini-map to help the
expert track the current viewpoint, which has proven effective in
TensorFlow [32].
Currently, we utilize a river-based visual metaphor to illustrate
the diverging and merging patterns. The layout of the datapaths
is calculated using a rule-based method (Sec. 5.2). Such a design
echoes the most common analytical task when three datapaths
need to be compared (adversarial examples, the normal source
examples, and the normal target examples). If more datapaths
are to be analyzed, an optimization-based layout method can be
applied. For example, we can minimize the mean-square-error
between the vector of real datapath distances and their screen
distances with a constraint so that the order of real datapath
distances is maintained. The above optimization problem is convex
(convex functions over convex sets) and guaranteed to achieve
a global minimum. As we have not observed such needs, we
leave this method in the discussion here. Apart from the river-
based visualization, the treemap-based visualization in the layer
level is the other factor that limits the ability to analyze a lot
of datapaths. The intuitive treemap-based design is suitable for
comparing several datapaths [53] and has been proven effective in
the case studies. We can further improve its scalability by adopting
a less intuitive but more scalable set of visualization techniques,
such as PowerSet [54].
Generalization. AEVis aims to analyze the adversarial examples
for CNNs because most research on adversarial attacks focuses on
generating adversarial images for CNNs.
In addition to attacking CNNs, there are several initial attempts
to attack other types of DNNs [10], such as recurrent neural
networks (RNNs), autoencoders (AEs), and deep generative models
(DGMs). In these types of DNNs, there are also neurons that are
critical for predictions. For example, Ming et al. [21] demonstrated
that some neurons in an RNN were critical for predicting the
sentiment of a sentence, such as the neurons for detecting
positive/negative words. Such neurons and their connections form
a datapath for an RNN. Thus, AEVis can be extended to help
understand the root cause of adversarial examples for these DNNs.
The main extension required is the development of suitable datapath
extraction and visualization methods for different types of DNNs.
For example, to visualize the datapath of RNNs, we can first unfold
the architecture of an RNN to a DAG [55], and then employ a DAG
layout algorithm to calculate the position of each unfolded layer.
In addition to images, there are adversarial attacks on other
types of data [10], such as adversarial documents and adversarial
videos. To generalize AEVis to different types of data, we need to
change the visual hint for neurons (learned features and activation
maps) according to the target data type. For example, when
analyzing adversarial documents, we can use a word cloud to
represent the ‘learned feature’ of a neuron [21], and select the
keywords that strongly activate the neuron.
8 CONCLUSION
We have presented a robustness-motivated visual analysis tool,
AEVis, to help machine learning experts investigate the prediction
process and understand the root cause of incorrect predictions of
adversarial examples. The visualization at multiple levels, together
with the constrained datapath extraction, allows efficient identifica-
tion of critical layers from datapaths’ diverging-merging patterns
and critical neurons from the activation maps. The contribution
analysis and the rich interactions further enable users to trace
the root cause of the misclassification of adversarial examples.
We conducted a quantitative experiment to evaluate the datapath
extraction method and a representative case study with an expert
to demonstrate the usefulness of AEVis in explaining the reasons
behind the misclassification of adversarial examples.
There are several directions we could follow in our future
research. First, based on the discovered root cause for misclassi-
fication, an interesting and important step forward is to develop
targeted defense solutions. We will continue working with machine
learning experts to explore an effective route from discovered cause
to targeted solutions for developing more adversarial robust DNN
models. Second, complementary to developing defense solutions,
another avenue is to detect potential adversarial examples online
and remove them from further processing. A set of streaming
visualizations that can incrementally integrate the incoming log
data with existing data is the key to online monitoring. Third, as
discussed in Sec. 7, an interesting direction is to generalize AEVis
to analyze the noise robustness of other types of DNNs, and to
tackle other types of data. Improving the scalability to deeper
DNNs and the visualization of more datapaths is also an area of
future interest. Different datapath extraction algorithms and suitable
visualization designs would be interesting research topics.
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